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Abstract
In this work, we investigate the profit maximization problem for a wireless network carrier and the
payment minimization for end-users. Motivated by recent findings on proactive resource allocation, we
focus on the scenario whereby end-users who are equipped with device-to-device (D2D) communication
can harness predictable demand in proactive data contents caching and the possibility of trading their
proactive downloads to minimize their expected payments. The carrier, on the other hand, utilizes a
dynamic pricing scheme to differentiate between off-peak and peak time prices and applies commissions
on each trading process to further maximize its profit. A novel marketplace that is based on risk sharing
between end-users is proposed where the tension between carrier and end-users is formulated as a
Stackelberg game. The existence and uniqueness of the non-cooperative sub-game Nash equilibrium is
shown. Furthermore, we explore the equilibrium points for the case when the D2D is available and when
it is not available, and study the impact of the uncertainty of users’ future demands on the system’s
performance. In particular, we compare the new equilibria with the baseline scenario of flat pricing.
Despite end-users connectivity with each other, the uncertainty of their future demands, and the freshness
of the pre-cached contents, we characterize a new equilibria region which yields to a win-win situation
with respect to the baseline equilibrium. We show that end-users’ activity patterns can be harnessed to
maximize the carrier’s profit while minimizing the end-users expected payments.
Index Terms
Game Theory, cellular network offloading, peer-to-peer trading, dynamic pricing, predictable de-
mand.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The tremendous increase in demand for spectrum-based services and devices has led network
carriers these days to experience a major demand and supply mismatch during the whole day.
Throughout the daytime, demand levels raise substantially reaching the network capacity and
causing excessive service costs and undesirable congestions. On the other hand, at the nighttime,
the demand significantly drops to minimum levels rendering the network resources severely
underutilized [1]. According to FCC report in 2002, these increasing demands are straining the
longstanding and outmoded spectrum policies [2]. Such a demand disparity is ultimately tied to
the end-user behavioral pattern which consistently shows that end-users are very active during the
peak hour, and idle at the off-peak time [3]–[5]. Interestingly, the time varying end-user activities,
that are ultimately behind this mismatch, can be exploited to solve this demand disparity.
As the peak-to-average demand problem has become more severe, the number of researches on
efficient control of the supplied services to best match the demand patterns has grown remarkably.
Dynamic pricing approach has gained a considerable amount of attention as a natural means of
influencing the users’ economic responsiveness to reduce their peak demand [6]. In fact, some
network operators outside the USA (such as Orange, MTN and Uninor) have already started
using adaptive pricing schemes to mitigate the excessive cost resulting from high bandwidth
consumption [7]- [8]. Moreover, the author in [9] shows how dynamic, time-dependent usage
pricing incentivizes end-users to spread out their bandwidth consumption more evenly across
different times of the day helping ISPs to overcome the problem of peak congestion. There
has been other attempts to formulate and study such a dynamic assignment of service prices in
[9], whereby the economic responsiveness of the end-users has been utilized through discount
incentives to defer the peak network load towards the off-peak time. These schemes, however,
rely on the assumption that end-users are willing to change their activity profile based on the
network prices, which seems a rather strong assumption since end-users activities are tied to
non-flexible constraints such as work, school, and sleep times. Thus, there is an inherent need
for a different paradigm of smart pricing that does not only facilitate the best utilization of the
network resources, but reasonably accounts for the user’s ability and willingness to comply with
certain incentive strategies.
WiFi data offloading, on the other hand, has a significant promise towards reducing the peak
3load of cellular networks. There has been a growing interest in analyzing and optimizing different
offloading schemes that reactively reschedule the cellular traffic over the WiFi infrastructure
while incentivizing end-users through less payments and higher data rates [10]–[12]. Attempts
to analyze the economics of such WiFi offloading approach are discussed in [13], [14]. In [13],
the scenario where end-users with expected WiFi connectivity utilize delayed WiFi download
strategies to minimize their payments in a Stackelberg game has been considered, with cellular
carriers play first by setting service prices to maximize their profit. It has been shown that
win-win situations can be achieved under some conditions on the WiFi availability, end-user
willingness to pay, and demand characteristics. In [14], the competition between WiFi Access
Point (AP) operators and cellular carriers has been considered, where equilibrium points of WiFi-
offloading amounts and corresponding pricing have been characterized. Those model, however,
tends to depend mainly on WiFi availability which affects end-user payment and carrier profit
and they also did not account for WiFi accessibility cost.
In a recent work [15], a different approach for price usage in data networks was proposed.
In particular, pricing has been concurrently employed with proactive data services to minimize
the time average cost incurred by the carriers. The primal use of pricing incentives has been
to enhance the certainty about which service the end-user will ask for. Hence, pricing has not
conflicted with the end-user activity. The high certainty about the future demand allowed for an
efficient employment of proactive data services, a scheme through which predictable peak-hour
demand is served ahead of time (mainly during the off-peak hour) to smooth-out the network
loads and minimize the expected carrier costs. In that work, however, the impact of pricing
allocation on the expected profit of the carrier has not been studied.
Device-to-device (D2D) communication has been proposed in [16] as a promising technology
that can relief the wireless networks congestion. A pair of end-user moving within a close
proximity to each other, can establish a D2D link that can be operated in the unlicensed spectrum
band, such as the industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) radio bands. These D2D links when used
as a traffic offloading approach introduces very little or no monetary cost for end-users. Through
exploring the social ties and influence among individuals, [17] studied D2D traffic offloading in
social networks where a novel approach to improve the performance of D2D communications
was proposed as a secondary link over cellular system. The authors in [18] studied the scenario
of traffic offloading for common contents to a group of end-users who are equipped with D2D
4communication. The optimal solution was achieved when the carrier sends different portions of
content to some end-users who share them to other end-users.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop a new framework that enables a wireless
carrier to increase its profit while end-users reduce their payments. This goal is achieved by
exploiting D2D communications when the carrier’s smart pricing coupled with end-users proac-
tive caching is applied so as to create a marketplace where all players act individually and
strategically. In this work we introduce a carrier assisted risk-sharing marketplace model that
allows multiple non-cooperative end-users to trade multiple distinct contents while minimizing
each end-user’s payment. In this proposed marketplace, the carrier applies dynamic commission
on each trading process and harnesses smart pricing schemes to control the amount and timing
of such downloads in a way that reduces its costs, and yields higher profit. End-users, on the
other hand, leverage proactive data downloads over cheap network interfaces and a possibility of
trading them to minimize their own payments. We formulate the tension between the two parties
as a Stackelberg game where the carrier sets prices first and N end-users respond with proactive
downloads and their selling prices. We take into account the uncertainties of connectivity between
users, end-users demand, and the freshness of proactive downloads.
We characterize the resulting equilibria points and compare them with the baseline equilibrium
defined under flat pricing and no proactive downloads. We show that, caching some data contents
in off-peak time enables end-users to save more money and hence increase their chance of
reducing their payment below the baseline. This proactive caching shifts some of the peak time
load to the off-peak time and hence reduces the service cost for the carrier. This allows the carrier
to increase its profit above the baseline. Furthermore, We show that a carrier allowing proactive
downloads with trading can make more profit than the case of allowing proactive downloads
only without trading. Users, on the same vein, save more by trading their proactive downloads
during the peak time and reduce their expected payment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we layout the system setup
and define the characteristics of its main components. We formulate the Stackelberg game and
study the structure of its equilibrium in Section III. In Sections IV we characterize the win-win
situations for disconnected end-users while in Section V we characterize the win-win situation
for the connected end-users. Numerical results are provided in Section VI, and the paper is
concluded in Section VII.
5II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a wireless communication system consisting of a single wireless
network carrier who supplies M data contents to N end-users upon demand as shown in Fig.
1. Depending on end-users consistent activities pattern, the carrier divides the day into off-peak
and peak times. The load requested by end-user j at time t is denoted by L(j)t , where t ∈ {o, p}
with o and p representing the off-peak and peak times, respectively. These loads are non-negative
random variables and assumed to satisfy Lˆp
(j)
> Lˆo
(j)
where Lˆt
(j)
= E[L(j)t ]. In order to reduce
its peak service cost, the carrier holds a marketplace that allows end-users to trade pre-cached
data contents between each other where the carrier earns a commission from each trade. In the
following, we introduce contents proactive download, contents trading and pricing models for
all parties.
D2D link D2D link
D2D link
Wireless 
Carrier
User 1 User 2 User N
Content 1 Content 2 Content M
………
Fig. 1: An illustration of the system model
A. Smart Pricing Policy
By harnessing end-users connectivity to each other and their expected consumption patterns,
the carrier produces a dynamic pricing policy (yp, yo, γ) which denotes the peak time price, off-
peak time price, and the trading commission, respectively. This smart pricing strategy is aimed
to spread-out the network peak time load and maximizes the carrier’s expected profit. Due to
6inherent market competition and the possibility of regulator rules, the smart pricing policy is
assumed to lie within a constraint set Y . In our analysis, we focus on maximum price constraints.
In particular, Y := {0 ≤ yt ≤ yˆ, t ∈ {o, p}}, where yˆ is an upper limit price imposed by the
regulator. Furthermore, the commission is defined such that γ ∈ [0, 1]. knowingly, the potential
proactive download and the trading actions affects the carrier pricing policies, and hence the
carrier optimizes its smart pricing policy so as to influence the marketplace towards its profit
maximization.
B. Proactive Content Download
Inspired by the growing body of evidence that human behavior is highly predictable [3]–
[5], [19], we assume that end-users can learn and predict their own and other end-users future
consumption and consequently apply proactive content download decisions during the off-peak
time taking on consideration all players interest to minimize their individual daily expected
payments by utilizing cheap network prices. end-user j’s peak time load is defined to be the
sum of requests to M uncorrelated data contents (e.g., YouTube video, Netflix movie, CNN
news thread, etc), that is, L(j)p :=
∑M
m=1 SmI
(j)
m , where Sm is the size of data content m, and
I(j)m is the indicator that end-user j requests data content m in the peak time. We use p(j)m to
denote P (I(j)m = 1) and we call it here user j’s interest in content m during the peak time and
assume it can be predicted by all parties. We also assume that all end-users take the decision
to download data contents at the beginning of each time slot t ∈ {o, p}. Driven by the different
pricing strategies employed by the carrier and the selling prices of the other users, the proactive
download decision made by end-user j in the off-peak time for data content m is denoted by x(j)m ,
where x(j)m ∈ [0, Sm]. Essentially, each end-user aims to maximally benefit from the potentially
lower off-peak prices by pre-caching data content for his future demand.
We also assume that the carrier cooperates with end-users and inform them with the availability
of data contents at other end-users. Consequently, end-users can save some money when they
purchase these data contents with lower prices from any end-user offering them for sale in
the peak time. Moreover, end-users who bought these data contents at the off-peak time can
compensate some of their payments by trading their proactive downloads. On the other hand,
carrier can achieve some gain through the commissions it earns from the content trading actions
of the end-users. Privacy concerns always arise in any social based system model. Although it is
7non of this paper’s purposes to suggest solutions to solve these issues, one way to tackle these
issue is as suggested in [20] by designing selectivity control mechanisms that allow users to
choose what contents they are willing to share and what contents they are not.
C. Content Trading
In order to allow content trading, we assume that end-users are equipped with WiFi direct
devices which allow the creation of peer-to-peer connections between WiFi client devices without
requiring the presence of a traditional WiFi infrastructure network (i.e., AP or router). In this
article we focus on the case of one-hop D2D communications only, and show how it can be
applied to allow end-users to trade data between them and get some saving in their payments.
We use the indicator I(j,i)w to indicate that end-user j and end-user i are connected together and
user j is offering the lowest selling price to user i. Thus, ω(j,i)p = P (I(j,i)w = 1) is the probability
that end-user j can transfer data to end-user i during the peak time. We will be calling ω(j,i)p the
connectivity of end-user j to end-user i.
We assume that source coding is applied so that the size, beginning and end of each data
content are known to all parties. Moreover, data contents get updated in the peak time and
the carrier always has the most fresh version of each content. The carrier keeps records for
what end-users download and when they download it. This allows the carrier to know which
part of the downloaded content at each end-user is still fresh. The proactive download carried
out by the end-user in the off-peak time is not guaranteed to be entirely fresh at the time of
consumption. That is, some content (especially news) may receive fast updates that essentially
render part of the proactive download irrelevant for peak time consumption. We capture the
freshness/correlation of data content m by a factor αm ∈ [0, 1] which is the fraction of x(j)m that
is fresh for consumption in the peak time.
To compensate his payment, end-users j can sell the fresh portions of his proactive download
to other end-users through the peer-to-peer connection during the peak-time by setting a per-
unit data price y(j)s . In order to avoid contents overlapping, we have I(i,j)xm as an indicator that
end-user i is going to buy a portion of the proactive download of end-user j and this happens
when x(i)m ≤ x(j)m . We use χ(i,j)m to denote P (I(i,j)xm = 1).
8III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first formulate the problem as a mutli-stage Stackelberg game. Then, the
Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game is investigated.
A. Stackelberg Game Formulation
We formulate the problem as a Stackelberg game with a complete and perfect information. In
this game, the carrier is the leader who starts by announcing his optimum smart pricing strategy
(y∗p, y
∗
o , γ
∗) taking into consideration the expected end-users reaction. After receiving the carrier
pricing strategy, each end-user announces his best selling price y∗(j)s . Finally, and based on the
received selling prices, all end-users react and choose their optimum proactive decision x∗(j)m for
each data content m. In the following two subsections we formulate the cost function for the
end-users and the carrier, respectively.
1) End-user Optimization: Driven by the announced carrier prices and the a-priori known
end-users interests, end-user j takes his proactive decisions in the off-peak time having in mind
the possibility of selling them to the other N − 1 end-users in the peak time. Moreover, for the
contents that end-user j decides to discard caching in the off-peak time, he tries to buy the fresh
portion of it in the peak time from any other end-user who cached it. Now, since the carrier
has the most fresh version of these data contents, during the peak time, end-user j refreshes
his proactive downloads and the contents he purchased from the other end-users. Hence, the
expected payment of end-user j is given by:
µ(j) = yo
(
Lˆo
(j)
+
M∑
m=1
x(j)m
)
+
M∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
i 6=j
y(i)s ω
(i,j)
p (x
(i)
m − x(j)m )χ(j,i)m p(j)m αm
+ yp
M∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
i 6=j
ω(i,j)p
[
Sm − αm
(
x(j)m + (x
(i)
m − x(j)m )χ(j,i)m
)]
p(j)m
+ yp
N∏
i=1
i 6=j
(
1− ω(i,j)p
) M∑
m=1
(Sm − αmx(j)m )p(j)m − y(j)s
M∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
i 6=j
ω(j,i)p (1− γ)αm(x(j)m − x(i)m )χ(i,j)m p(i)m
(1)
In (1), we note that end-user j is minimizing his payment by caching proactively an amount
x
(j)
m from each data content m during the off-peak time using the cellular network resources. He
9also purchases the fresh non-overlapping portion of other end-users proactive downloads when
they are connected to him. Moreover, he tries to sell his proactive downloads in the peak time
to any other end-user who is looking for it. So, he tries to find the best selling price to offer his
proactive download for sale. Thus, end-user j’s best-response is given by:
(x∗(j)m , y
∗(j)
s ) := arg min
x
(j)
m ∈[0,Sm]
0≤y(j)s ≤yp
µ(j) (2)
2) Carrier Optimization: In the Stackelberg formulation, the carrier plays first by finding a
new smart pricing that maximizes his expected profit R. This profit R is shaped by the difference
between its incurred cost to provide the service, denoted by η, and the received payments from
all users, i.e.,
R :=
N∑
j=1
µ∗(j) − η (3)
where µ∗(j) is the expected optimized payment for end-user j. It is important to mention that the
total payments received for all end-users (i.e.
∑N
j=1 µ
∗(j)) includes the commission from every
trade. We consider the carrier’s cost to be proportional to the maximum load it incurs from all
end-users throughout the day which is the sum of the off-peak and peak loads. The off-peak
load represents the sum of the end-users proactive downloads and the average off-peak demand.
The peak load represents the refreshing and completion of all data contents for all end-users.
Thus, the carrier’s cost is given by:
η = βE
[
max
{
N∑
j=1
[
Lˆo
(j)
+
M∑
m=1
x∗(j)m
]
,
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
i 6=j
M∑
m=1
I(j,i)w
[
Sm − αm
(
x(j)m + (x
(i)
m − x(j)m )I(j,i)xm
)]
I(j)m
+
N∑
j=1
N∏
i=1
i 6=j
(
1− I(j,i)w
) M∑
m=1
(Sm − αmx(j)m )I(j)m


(4)
where β is the cost factor of the carrier. The carrier aims to find the prices y∗o , y
∗
p and the
commission γ∗ that maximizes his profit. Hence, taking into consideration all users, the optimal
pricing policy is:
(y∗o , y
∗
p, γ
∗) := arg max
(yo,yp)∈Y
γ∈[0,1]
R (5)
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We denote the equilibrium profit under optimized smart pricing by R∗. The Stackelberg
equilibrium for the proposed game is investigated in the following subsection.
B. Stackelberg equilibrium
Generally, the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) for a Stackelberg game can be obtained by finding
its subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium (NE). As we can see from the game formulation, all
end-users are competing with each other and creating a non-cooperative subgame. For this non-
cooperative subgame, NE is defined as the the strategy profile at which no player can minimize
his payment by changing his strategy unilaterally.
Now, since there is only one carrier, the best response of the carrier can be obtained by
solving (5). However, because the carrier derive its pricing strategy based on the expected end-
users payments, backward induction will be followed by finding the optimum solution for the
end-users first, then we find the best pricing strategy for the carrier. We now show the existence
and uniqueness of the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium as defined in [21].
Proposition 1. In the studied single leader multi-followers game, given that the carrier has
announced his best response, there exists a unique NE for the non-cooperative subgame between
the N end-users (followers).
Proof:
The existence follows from Schauder Fixed-Point Theorem [22] since the best-response func-
tions of the end-users are continuous and end-users strategy sets are convex and compact. For the
uniqueness, we can see that for a fixed leader strategy the sum of end-users utilities is diagonally
strictly concave. Thus, by Rosen theorem, we have a unique Stackelberg Equilibrium [23].
Now, we study the effect of end-users proactive behaviour and investigate its equilibrium point
and then compare it with the flat pricing scenario. Then we study the effect of trading between
end-users and investigate its equilibrium point and then compare it with the flat pricing scenario.
IV. DISCONNECTED END-USERS STACKELBERG GAME
In this section, we study the case where end-users are disconnected and playing separately
with the carrier (i.e. ω(i,j)p = 0 ∀i, j). First, we pose the price and proactive download allocation
problem, then we introduce our baseline decisions and define the performance metrics.
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A. The Stackelberg Game
1) End-user Optimization: For the case when ω(i,j)p = 0 ∀i, j , (1) reduces to cover the
proactive download carried out by the end-user in the off-peak time and the refreshing process
that happens in the peak time. Hence the expected end-user payment is given by:
µ(j) = yo
(
Lˆo
(j)
+
M∑
m=1
x(j)m
)
+ yp
M∑
m=1
(Sm − αmx(j)m )p(j)m (6)
Besides the off-peak demand, each end-user downloads proactively an amount of x(j)m from data
content m during the off-peak time. Then he refreshes his proactive downloads and completes
the remaining part of each data content during the peak-time. The user’s optimization on such
decisions is given by: min{xm∈[0,Sm]}m µ(j), which ultimately yields the following structure to
optimal proactive download response over the cellular resources, x∗(j)m :
x∗(j)m =
Sm, pi
(j)
m ≥ yoyp ,
0, otherwise
(7)
where pi(j)m := αmp
(j)
m captures the freshness-popularity product of source m for end-user j. We
can see that sources with high values of pi(j)m are more likely to be proactively served. Thus,
without loss of generality, let us assume in the sequel that data sources are ordered such that
pi
(j)
1 > · · · > pi(j)M , and we use pi(j)0 := 1. Then Let us combine the popularity-freshness products
of all end-users for all data contents together in one collection and sort them descendingly to
get a new set Π = {pik, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · ,MN}
∣∣∣pi0 > pi1 > pi2 > · · · > piMN}. We also denote
by µ∗(j) the optimized end-user payment through off-peak proactive downloads.
2) Carrier Optimization: As there is no trading between users, because they are not con-
nected together, the carrier will not earn any commission as a revenue resource and then (4)
reduces as follows:
η = βE
[
max
{
N∑
j=1
(
Lˆo
(j)
+
M∑
m=1
x∗(j)m
)
, +
N∑
j=1
(Sm − αmx∗(j)m )I(j)m
}]
(8)
Hence, the optimal pricing policy is (y∗o , y
∗
p) := arg max(yo,yp)∈Y R, which implicitly involves
the assignment of a threshold M∗(j) for which end-user j will proactively fetch content from
sources with indexes m ≤M∗(j) over the cellular connection. We denote the equilibrium profit
under optimized smart pricing by R∗.
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B. Performance Metrics
To evaluate the potential gains of smart pricing and its effect on influencing the demand
to minimize the cost, we compare the resulting equilibrium point (µ∗(j), R∗) with a baseline
point (µ˜(j), R˜). The baseline is defined under the scenario of flat pricing yˆ over the whole day,
and no proactive downloads. This is motivated by the flat pricing strategies employed currently
by several carriers such as AT&T’s $10/GB, or $5/50MB. Further, we adopt the savings gain
∆µ(j) := µ˜(j) − µ∗(j), and profit gain ∆R := R∗ − R˜ as our performance metrics for this
system. We investigate the potential of win-win situations, i.e., ∆µ(j) > 0 ∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
and ∆R > 0 under the maximum price constraints.
Under maximum price constrains, the carrier’s peak price is yp = yˆ while its off-peak price
is always yo ≤ yˆ. Based on the carrier choice of yo, each end-user will react according to
(7) and cache M∗(j) data contents proactively. The carrier can simply set yo = yˆpik for k ∈
{0, 1, 2, · · · ,MN}, i.e. yo takes values from yo = yˆpi0 = yˆ to yo = yˆpiMN . Each value of k has
a set of corresponding k(j)’s where every k(j) is related to end-user j and k =
∑N
j=1 k
(j). This
means that end-user j will cache contents from sources with indexes m ≤ k(j). Consequently,
the optimum off-peak price is yo = yˆpiM∗ where M∗ has as set of corresponding M∗(j)’s with
M∗(j) related to end-user j and M∗ =
∑N
j=1M
∗(j).
Proposition 2. The equilibrium pricing strategy under maximum price constraints is given by:
y∗p = yˆ, and y
∗
o = yˆpiM∗ , where M
∗ =
arg max
k∈{0,··· ,MN}
yˆpik
N∑
j=1
Lˆ(j)o + k(j)∑
m=1
Sm
+ yˆ N∑
j=1
 k(j)∑
m=1
Sm(1− α(j)m )p(j)m +
M∑
m=k(j)+1
Smp
(j)
m

−βE
max

N∑
j=1
L(j)o + k(j)∑
m=1
Sm
 , N∑
j=1
 k(j)∑
m=1
Sm(1− α(j)m )I(j)m +
M∑
m=k(j)+1
SmI(j)m

 .
(9)
Proof: The proof is straightforward by observing the threshold based structure to the
proactive downloads. And the threshold M∗ maximizes the carrier’s profit.
We note that pi(j)0 = 1 ∀j by definition, so the carrier can never get lower profit than of flat
pricing. Next, we characterize the condition on the win-win equilibrium.
Theorem 1. Under the assumptions of Proposition 2, the win-win equilibrium ∆µ(j) > 0 ∀j ∈
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{1, 2, · · · , N} and ∆R > 0 is attained if and only if:
β
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Smp
(j)
m > β
(
S1 +
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
)
+ yˆ(1− pi(1)1 )
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
(10)
Proof: Proof is provided in Appendix A.
Using this theorem the carrier can decide, before starting the game, whether to apply smarting
pricing that will allow proactive caching or to use the baseline scenario of a flat pricing by
setting yo = yˆ. Next we investigate the impact of the connected end-users case on the win-win
equilibrium.
V. CONNECTED END-USERS STACKELBERG GAME
We now consider the case where end-users are connected together (i.e. ω(i,j)p > 0∀i, j ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N}). Hence, there will be always a possibility of trading to happen between them. In
the following, we pose the price and proactive download allocation problem, then we introduce
our baseline decisions and define the performance metrics.
A. The Stackelberg Game
1) end-users optimization: end-user j minimizes his net payment by proactively download-
ing an amount x(j)m from each source m during the off-peak time as well as selling his proactive
downloads to other end-users. He may also purchase some of the other end-users proactive
downloads. The optimal proactive download decision x∗(j)m of end-user j is as follows:
x∗(j)m =

Sm , pi
(j)
m >
yo−
N∑
i=1
i 6=j
y
(j)
s (1−γ)ω(j,i)p χ(i,j)m pi(i)m
N∏
i=1
i 6=j
ω
(i,j)
p yp+
N∑
i=1
i 6=j
ω
(i,j)
p
(
χ
(j,i)
m yp+χ
(j,i)
m y
(i)
s
)
0 , otherwise
(11)
where χ(j,i)m = 1− χ(j,i)m . As we can see, end-user j’s decision depends on his interest in the
content m and other end-users’ interest. This leads us to the following claim:
Claim 1. For any content m, if pi(j)m > pi(i)m , i 6= j, then x∗(j)m ≥ x∗(i)m with equality holds when
x
∗(j)
m = 0.
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Proof: Consider the case when w(i,j)p = 1. Suppose x
∗(j)
m = 0 then from (11) pi
(j)
m ≤ yoyp .
Since pi(i)m < pi
(j)
m , then pi
(i)
m ≤ yoyp . This means that pi
(i)
m <
yo
y
(j)
s
which yields to x∗(i)m = 0. Now,
Suppose x∗(j)m = Sm. If x
∗(i)
m = 0 then x
∗(j)
m > x
∗(i)
m . If x
∗(i)
m = Sm then x
∗(j)
m = x
∗(i)
m .
Since we have the assumption that end-users interest are never equal, then there will be always
an end-user who has the highest interest in content m and this end-user will be the only seller
for this content as he will offer a selling price that will encourage all the other N − 1 end-users
to wait until the peak time and purchase it from him. Moreover, since buyers here are symmetric
and no competition exists in the buying process, it is sufficient to consider the case of one buyer
and then we can generalize the result to cover the N − 1 buyers. Therefore, in this section we
will limit our study to the case of two end-users (one seller and one buyer) to investigate and
show the gain of our proposed model.
We start our analysis by assuming that pi(j)m > pi
(i)
m , ∀m ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k1} and pi(i)m > pi(j)m ,∀m ∈
{k1 + 1, k1 + 2, · · · ,M}. According to claim 1, we have 2 cases, the end-user who has a higher
interest buys a certain data content while the other end-user waits until the peak-time, or both
of them discarding buying in the off-peak time and buy it in the peak time from the carrier.
Hence (1) can be rewritten as the following:
µ(j) = yo
(
Lˆo
(j)
+
M∑
m=1
x(j)m
)
+ y(i)s ω
(i,j)
p
M∑
m=1
αm(x
(i)
m − x(j)m )χ(j,i)m p(j)m
+ yp(1− ω(i,j)p )
M∑
m=1
(Sm − αmx(j)m )p(j)m − y(j)s ω(j,i)p (1− γ)
k1∑
m=1
αm(x
(j)
m − x(i)m )χ(i,j)m p(i)m
+ ypω
(i,j)
p
M∑
m=1
[
Sm − αm
(
x(j)m + (x
(i)
m − x(j)m )χ(j,i)m
)]
p(j)m
(12)
Thus, end-user j’s best-response is given by:
(x∗(j)m , y
∗(j)
s ) := arg min
x
(j)
m ∈[0,Sm]
0≤y(j)s ≤yp
µ(j) (13)
However, since we have pi(j)m > pi
(i)
m , ∀m ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k1} and pi(i)m > pi(j)m ,∀m ∈ {k1 + 1, k1 +
2, · · · ,M}, this means that χ(j,i)m = 0 and χ(i,j)m = 1 for all m ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k1} and we have
χ
(j,i)
m = 1 and χ
(i,j)
m = 0 for all m ∈ {k1 + 1, k1 + 2, · · · ,M}. From this, we can simplify (11)
as follows:
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For all m ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k1} and given the carrier optimum strategies, we have:
x∗(i)m =
 Sm , pi
(i)
m >
yo
yp(1−ω(i,j)p )+y(j)s ω(i,j)p
0 , otherwise
(14)
x∗(j)m =
 Sm , pi
(j)
m >
yo−(1−γ)y(j)s ω(i,j)p pi(i)m
yp
0 , otherwise
(15)
As we can see from (14) and (15), the proactive decisions of both end-users j and i are affected
by the selling price of end-user j. Thus, end-user j will evaluate all of the possible selling prices
for the sources which he decided to cache and chooses the best one that maximize his revenue.
In accordance, end-user i takes his proactive decisions which minimizes his payment too. Hence
the optimum flat selling price of end-user j is given by:
y∗(j)s =
yo − yp(1− ω(i,j)p )pi(i)q∗(j)
ω
(i,j)
p pi
(i)
q∗(j)
, where q∗(j) = arg max
r∈{1,··· ,M∗(j)}
pi(i)m , and M
∗(j) ≤ k1 (16)
Similarly, for all m ∈ {k1 + 1, k1 + 2, · · · ,M} we have:
x∗(j)m =
 Sm , pi
(j)
m >
yo
yp(1−ω(j,i)p )+y(i)s ω(j,i)p
0 , otherwise
(17)
x∗(i)m =
 Sm , pi
(i)
m >
yo−(1−γ)y(i)s ω(j,i)p pi(i)m
yp
0 , otherwise
(18)
and the optimum flat selling price of end-user i is given by:
y∗(i)s =
yo − yp(1− ω(i,j)p )pi(j)q∗(i)
ω
(i,j)
p pi
(j)
q∗(i)
, where q∗(i) = arg max
r∈{1,··· ,M∗(i)}
pi(j)m , and M
∗(i) ≤ k1 (19)
2) Carrier Optimization: Now, the carrier’s expected profit R is given by:
R := µ∗(j) + µ∗(i) − η (20)
where η is defined as in (4). The carrier aims to find the prices y∗o , y
∗
p and the commission
γ∗ that maximizes his profit as in (5). This implicitly involves the assignment of a threshold
M∗(j) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k1} for end-user j which defines the data contents he will be able to cache
and a similar threshold M∗(i) ∈ {k1 + 1, k1 + 2, · · · ,M} for end-user i. Also, carrier’s prices y∗o
and y∗p affects the selling prices of both users y
∗(j)
s and y
∗(i)
s .
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Proposition 3. The carrier equilibrium pricing strategy under maximum price constraints is
given by:
(y∗p, y
∗
o , γ
∗) = arg max
yo,yp∈[0,yˆ]
γ∈[0,1]
(
µ(j) + µ(j) − η) (21)
B. Performance Metrics
Here, we investigate the potential of the win-win situation, i.e., ∆µ(j) > 0 ∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
and ∆R > 0. Inspired by the two connected end-users game discussed above, we can extend it
to the case where we have N end-users. Now, for each data content m, one of the end-users
will be the most interested user in this data content m among other end-user. This end-user will
download that data content during the off-peak time and then try to trade it in the peak time
to the other end-users who did not buy in the off-peak time as shown in claim 1. Given the
diversity of end-users’ interests each end-user will proactively cache some data contents and
buy some data contents from the other end-users and finally go to the carrier to complete or
refresh his downloads. Now, we characterize the conditions for the win-win equilibrium in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, the win-win equilibrium ∆µ(j) > 0 ∀j ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N} and ∆R > 0 is attained if and only if
β
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Smp
(j)
m > β
(
S1 +
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
)
+ yˆ(1− pi(1)1 )
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+ yˆS1
1− pi(1)1
max
j∈{2,··· ,N}
pi
(j)
1
 N∑
j=2
pi
(j)
1
(22)
Proof: proof is provided in Appendix B.
We can see that the carrier will gain some more profit due to this trading process when it
applies the smart pricing policy. On the other hand, end-users will gain some saving from both
proactive caching and the trading process.
Proposition 4. The probability of a win-win situation in the case of the connected users is more
than its probability in the case of disconnected users.
Proof: The proof is straightforward by comparing (22) with (10) and noticing that the
win-win equilibrium region in the connected users case expands monotonically
17
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Fig. 2: System Performance for (N = 1) versus end-user interest
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To verify the derived results, we start with the case of one end-user only with varying interest
to study the effect of end-user interest on the system performance. This end-user consumes data
from M = 5 data sources in the peak time. The amount consumed from each data source is
S = 100 units. Sources have different freshness [1.0, 0.95, 0.90, 0.85, 0.80]. We start with pm = 0
for all data contents and then increase it until we reach pm = 1. We take yˆ = 1 and β = 0.75.
We plot the profit and saving gains ∆R and ∆µ versus end-user interest. Moreover, we compare
the off-peak and peak loads of our model with the flat pricing model. The results are depicted
in Fig. 2.
As we can notice in Fig. 2, a win-win equilibrium is attained whenever end-user interest is
positive. This is clear as the smart pricing incentives the end-user to apply proactive download
which reduces his average payment. On the other hand, proactive download reduces the carrier
peak load which yields reducing the cost. These gains increase as the interest of the end-user
increases since he can cache more contents and consequently the peak load decreases. The carrier
18
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Fig. 3: System Performance versus no. of end-users (fixed interests)
gains almost 65% while end-user saves about 20% of his payment. Moreover, we can see that
allowing end-user to download some of the data contents proactively shifts the peak time load
to the off-peak time and hence we have almost flat network utilization.
Next, we study the effect of engaging more end-users in the network. Let us consider a system
consisting of N = 1, 2, · · · , 20 end-users consuming data from the same M = 5 data sources
in the peak time. Those end-users are disconnected and hence they can not trade their proactive
downloads. We start by one end-user and then we add more end-users to the network. Here,
end-users interests are the same for each content m. The freshness of the data contents are
[1.0, 0.95, 0.90, 0.85, 0.80]. We plot the profit and savings gains ∆R and ∆µ versus number of
users. we compare the off-peak and peak loads of our model with the flat pricing model. The
results are depicted in Fig. 3.
As we can notice in Fig. 3, regardless of the number of end-users the carrier can manage
to attain a fixed gain. This is in fact because the carrier smart pricing will not change as it
is determined by the highest interested end-user and all end-users have the same interest. So,
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adding new end-users will not change the carrier prices and hence all end-users will download
the same amount proactively. The carrier can attain an equilibrium and achieve almost 75%
profit gain. On the other hand, the end-users can achieve an average payment saving of almost
20%. Moreover, the network load is distributed between the off-peak and peak time which also
relieves the network congestion during the peak time and tackles the problem of network under
utilization during the off-peak time.
Now, let us investigate the effect of adding more end-users with increasing interests. We
generate an increasing contents interest for the end-users and add them one by one to the
network. We keep all the other system parameter as above. We plot the carrier gain versus the
number of end-users and we also compare the off-peak and peak loads with the flat pricing
model. The results are depicted in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4: System Performance versus no. of end-users (increasing interest)
As we can notice in Fig. 4, the carrier achieves more gain when more interested end-users
are engaged in the network. That is because adding more interested users makes the carrier
increase the off-peak price which means increasing the revenue. Moreover, the average end-
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users saving increases as the number of more interested end-users increase. This result gives
the carrier a signal to invest more in the contents popularity to engage more end-users in the
network. Moreover, the network load is distributed between the off-peak and peak time which
also relieves the network congestion during the peak time and tackles the problem of network
under utilization during the off-peak time.
From Theorem 2, we saw that trading between end-users helps both the carrier and the end-
users to gain more. To verify this result, let us consider a system consisting of two end-users
consuming data from M = 5 data sources in the peak time according to different interests
where end-user j is more interested than end-user i as follows: the interest of end-user j is
p
(j)
m = [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0] while the interest of end-user i is p
(i)
m = [0.95, 0.90, 0.85, 0.80, 0.75].
All data contents have the same freshness αm = 0.90. The off-peak loads of both end-users are
L
(j)
o = 0 and L
(i)
o = 0. The amounts consumed from all sources are equal to S = 100 units.
We investigate the effect of connectivity between the two end-users on the carrier profit and
the end-users gains. We also investigate the effect of end-users connectivity on the off-peak and
peak loads. The results are depicted in Fig. 5.
As we can see, although when the end-users are disconnected (i.e. ω(j,i)p = 0) they were able
to download proactively some of the data contents during the off-peak time and then refresh
and download the remaining data contents during the peak time. The carrier achieves a gain of
almost 60% while the most interest user (end-user j) achieves almost 20%. Although the peak
load in the flat pricing model hits 95%, it is distributed between the off-peak and peak times in
the case of our model. The gain of the carrier profit and the saving of end-user j increase as the
connectivity increases. On the other hand, when end-users are fully connected (i.e. ω(j,i)p = 1),
the carrier achieves a gain of almost 98% and end-user j achieves almost 45%. We can also see
that the peak load decreases as the connectivity between end-users increases. The reason behind
that is, when users get connected, only end-user j downloads data contents and end-user i wait
for him. Moreover, this plot supports the results we mentioned in Proposition 4. Trading helped
the carrier to shift the peak load to the off-peak time and gain more profit whereas end-users
saved more when they shared their proactive downloads.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we seek to harness the unexploited predictability of users’ demand pattern and
the possibility of end-users being connected with each other in providing an efficient remedy
to the wireless spectrum crisis. In particular, A novel marketplace that is based on risk sharing
between end-users is proposed where the tension between carrier and end-users is formulated
as a Stackelberg game. In order to maximize its profit, the carrier set a time dependent pricing
policy and a varying commission so as to influence end-users to trade contents between each
other and balance their demand throughout the day. End-users, on the other hand, utilize their
predictable demand and the possibility of them being connected with each other in determining
optimal proactive download decisions in the off-peak time, and selling price for the peak time,
so as to minimize their expected payments. Unlike existing reactive time dependent pricing
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and WiFi off-loading schemes where end-users have to delay their demand and wait for cheap
network prices, this proactive based marketplace offers content before demand and avoid the
change of the users’ behavior.
We explored the equilibrium points for the case when the D2D is available and when it is
not available, and study the impact of the uncertainty of users’ future demands on the system
performance. We compared the new equilibria with the baseline scenario of flat pricing model
where no caching is allowed. For end-users connectivity, we showed that as the connectivity
between end-users increases, all parties achieve more gain. For contents interest, we showed that
as the interest of end-users increase, all parties achieve more gain. Moreover, we have shown
that having one user at least with a non-zero interest will lead to a win-win situation regardless
of the users being connected or not.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: We have N disconnected end-users (i.e. w(i,j)p = 0 ∀i,∀j) consuming data from
M data sources. From Proposition 2, yp = yˆ and yo ≤ yˆ. Moreover, let Π = {pik, k ∈
{0, · · · ,MN}
∣∣∣pi0 > pi1 > pi2 > · · · > piMN} as defined in Section III. The carrier, then,
can simply set yo = yˆpik for k ∈ {0, · · · ,MN} and choose the one that gives optimum gain.
We now investigate the win-win region Rdk, where d denotes disconnected, for each value of yo
where Rdk is defined as:
Rdk =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, · · · , N}
∣∣∣yp = yˆ, yo = yˆpik,∆µ(j) > 0 ,∆R > 0} (23)
A. For k = 0:
For k = 0, we have yp = yˆ, yo = yˆpi0 = yˆ hence yp = yo. The saving in end-user payment is:
∆µ(j) = µ˜(j) − µ∗(j) = (yp − yo)Lˆo(j) = 0 (24)
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and the carrier profit gain is:
∆R = R∗ − R˜ = (yo − yp)
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
= 0 (25)
Thus, the win-win region for this case as follows:
Rd0 =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣yo = yˆ,∆µ(j) > 0 ∀j,∆R > 0} = φ (26)
B. For k = MN :
For k = MN , we have yp = yˆ, yo = yˆpiMN . The saving in end-user payment is:
∆µ(j) = yp(1− piMN)Lˆo(j) + yp
M∑
m=1
Sm(pi
(j)
m − piMN) > 0 (27)
and the carrier profit gain can be found by:
∆R = (yppiMN − yp − β)
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+ yp
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Sm(piMN − pi(j)m )− β
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Sm(1− p(j)m ) < 0
(28)
Thus, the win-win region for this case is:
RdMN =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣yo = yˆpiMN ,∆µ(j) > 0 ∀j,∆R > 0} = φ
(29)
C. For 0 < k < MN :
For 0 < k < MN , we have yp = yˆ, yo = yˆpik. From (7) we can see that if k = 1, only
one end-user caches data content m = 1 and other end-users will not. If we assume that this
end-user is end-user 1, then we have his saving as::
∆µ(1) = (yp − yo)Lˆo(1) + S1(yppi1 − yo) = yp(1− pi1)Lˆo(1) > 0 (30)
while ∆µ(j) = yp(1− pi1)Lˆo(j) > 0 ∀j ∈ {2, · · · , N}. The carrier profit gain has can fall in two
cases depending on the load:
If
∑N
j=1
∑M
m=1 Smp
(j)
m <
∑N
j=1 Lˆo
(j)
+ S1(1 + pi1) Then,
∆R = yp(1− pi1)
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j) − β
(
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+ S1
)
+ β
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Smp
(j)
m
25
Hence, a win-win situation happens when:
β
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Smp
(j)
m > β
(
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+ S1
)
+ yp(1− pi1)
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
(31)
If
∑N
j=1
∑M
m=1 Smp
(j)
m >
∑N
j=1 Lˆo
(j)
+ S1(1 + pi1) Then,
∆R = (yo − yp)Lˆo + (yo − yppi1 − βpi1)S1 = yp(pi1 − 1)Lˆo − βpi1S1
Hence, a win-win situation happens when
βS1pi1 > yp(1− pi1)
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
(32)
Notice that if (31) is satisfied then we can guarantee that (32) is satisfied. Hence, it is sufficient
to consider (31) for defining the win-win region in this case. i.e.
Rd1 =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣yo = yˆpi1,
β
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Smp
(j)
m > β
(
S1 +
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
)
+ yˆ(1− pi1)
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
} (33)
Similarly the carrier can set yo = yˆpik for any k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,MN − 1}. This leads to a
corresponding M∗(j) for each end-user such that
∑N
j=1M
∗(j) = k. Hence, we can define the
win-win area as follows:
Rdk =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣yo = yˆpik, β N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Smp
(j)
m >
β
 N∑
j=1
M∗(j)∑
m=1
Sm +
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+ yˆ(1− pik) N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+ yˆ
N∑
j=1
M∗(j)∑
m=1
(pi(j)m − pik)Sm
} (34)
Finally, one can define the overall win-win region Rww to be the region were any win-win
situation can happen as follows:
Rdww =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣∆µ(j) > 0 ∀j,∆R > 0} (35)
and the union of all the win-win regions we have found for each carrier strategy has to be a
subset of the overall win-win region:
MN⋃
i=0
Rdi ⊆ Rdww (36)
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Now, define Rdww to be the region were no win-win situation can happen and is defined as:
Rdww =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣∆µ(j) ≤ 0 ∀j,∆R ≤ 0} (37)
Also ∀k ∈ {0,MN},
Rdk =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣yo = yppik,∆µ(j) ≤ 0 ∀j,∆R ≤ 0} (38)
Now, the intersection of all regions of no win-win for each carrier strategy has to be a subset
of the over all region of no win-win:
MN⋂
i=0
Rdi ⊆ Rdww ⇐⇒
(MN⋃
i=0
Rdi
)
⊆
(
Rdww
)
⇐⇒ Rdww ⊆
MN⋃
i=0
Rdi (39)
From (36) and (39) we conclude that:
Rdww =
MN⋃
i=0
Rdi (40)
Moreover, we notice that Rd1 ⊇ Rd2 ⊇ Rd3 ⊇ · · · . ⊇ RdMN−1 , then
⋃MN
i=0 Rdi = Rd1, then
Rdww =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣
β
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Smp
(j)
m > β
(
S1 +
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
)
+ yˆ(1− pi(1)1 )
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
} (41)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: We have N connected end-users consuming data from M data contents. The carrier
sets the off-peak price such that only the highest interested user will buy in the peak time as
shown in Claim 1. Suppose that data contents are sorted descendingly according to the interest
of the highest interested end-user. Let pik = max(pi
(1)
k , pi
(2)
k , · · · , pi(N)k ) for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}.
Hence, we get a new set of freshness-popularity products Π = {pik, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · ,M}
∣∣∣pi0 >
pi1 > pi2 > · · · > piM}. Therefore, the carrier can simply set y0 = yˆpik for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}.
Moreover, the carrier sets γ ≤ 1. We now investigate the win-win region Rck, where c denotes
connected, for each value of yo where Rdk is defined as:
Rck =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, · · · , N}
∣∣∣yo = yˆpik,∆µ(j) > 0 ,∆R > 0} (42)
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A. For 0 ≤ k ≤M and γ = 1:
The carrier is applying smart pricing but when γ = 1 we can see from (13) and (14) that
each end-user will cache the data contents if his interest pi(j)m > yoyp and no one will wait for the
highest interested end-user regardless of his selling price. Hence, the win-win region here will
be similar to that of the disconnected end-users under the same choice of yo and yp.
Rck = Rdk 0 ≤ k ≤M (43)
B. For k = 0 and γ < 1:
We can see from (13) and (14) that no end-user is going to download any data content
proactively which means that no trading is going to happen between them. Hence, we have the
same scenario as in (24) and (25). Thus, ∆µ(j) = 0 for j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} and ∆R = 0. Hence,
the win-win region will be the same as the disconnected case. i.e. we have:
Rc0 =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, · · · , N}
∣∣∣yo = yp,∆µ(j) > 0,∆R > 0} = φ = Rd0 (44)
C. For k > 0 and γ < 1:
In this case, for each source the end-user with the highest interest caches it in the off-peak
time while other end-users wait and buy the fresh portion from him in the peak time. Let us
assume, without loss of generality, that end-user 1 has the highest interest in data contents m ∈
{1, 2, · · · , k1} and end-user 2 has the highest interest in data contents m ∈ {k1+1, k1+2, · · · , k2}
and so on. Generally, end-user j has the highest interest in data contents m ∈ {kj−1 + 1, kj−1 +
2, · · · , kj} for j ∈ 1, 2, · · · , N where k0 = 0, such that
∑N
j=1(kj − kj−1) = M . Hence, the
freshness-popularity product set will be,
Π =
{
pi0, pi1, · · · , pik1 , pik1+1, · · · , pik2 , · · · , pikN−1+1, · · · , pikN
}
=
{
pi
(1)
0 , pi
(1)
1 , · · · , pi(1)k1 , pi
(2)
k1+1
, · · · , pi(2)k2 , · · · , pi
(N)
kN−1+1, · · · , pi
(N)
kN
} (45)
If the carrier sets yo = yˆpi
(1)
1 , yp = yˆ and γ < 1, then end-user 1 who is the most interested
end-user in this data content reacts by caching it proactively while other end-users wait and buy
it from him. Now, lets investigate the possibility of a win-win situation for this case by checking
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∆µ(j) and ∆R. For user 1 we have:
∆µ(1) = yp(1− pi(1)1 )Lˆo
(1)
+ y(1)s S1(1− γ)
N∑
j=2
pi
(j)
1 > 0 (46)
and ∆µ(j) > 0 for all j ∈ {2, · · · , N}
∆µ(j) = yp(1− pi(1)1 )Lˆo
(j)
+ (yp − y(1)s )S1pi(j)1 > 0 (47)
The carrier profit gain is:
∆R = yp(pi
(1)
1 − 1)
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+ ypS1
 pi(1)1
max
j∈{2,··· ,N}
pi
(j)
1
− 1
 N∑
j=2
pi
(j)
1
− β
(
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+ S1 −
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Smp
(j)
m
) (48)
Hence, a win-win situation is:
Rc1 =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣yo = yˆpi(1)1 , β N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Smp
(j)
m >
β
(
S1 +
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
)
+ yˆ(1− pi(1)1 )
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+ yˆS1
1− pi(1)1
max
j∈{2,··· ,N}
pi
(j)
1
 N∑
j=2
pi
(j)
1
} (49)
If the carrier sets yo = yˆpi
(1)
k1
, yp = yˆ and γ < 1, then end-user 1 caches data contents
m ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k1} proactively while other end-users wait and buy it from him. Hence, the
win-win region is:
Rck1 =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣yo = yˆpi(1)k1 ,
β
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Smp
(j)
m > β
(
k1∑
m=1
Sm +
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
)
+ yˆ(1− pi(1)k1 )
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+ yˆ
k1∑
m=1
(pi(1)m − pi(1)k1 )Sm + yˆ
1− pi
(1)
k1
max
j∈{2,··· ,N}
m∈{1,··· ,k1}
pi
(j)
m

N∑
j=2
k1∑
m=1
Smpi
(j)
m
} (50)
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If the carrier sets yo = yˆpi
(2)
k2
and yp = yˆ, then end-user 1 reacts by caching data contents
m ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k1} and sells it to all other end-users. Moreover, end-user 2 reacts by caching
data contents m ∈ {k1 +1, k1 +2, · · · , k2} and sells it to all other end-users. Hence for end-user
1 we have:
∆µ(1) = yp(1− pi(2)k2 )Lˆo
(1)
+ yp
k1∑
m=1
Sm(pi
(1)
m − pi(2)k2 ) + (yp − y(2)s )
k2∑
m=k1+1
Smpi
(1)
m
+ y(1)s (1− γ)
N∑
j=2
k1∑
m=1
Smpi
(j)
m > 0
(51)
For end-user 2 we have:
∆µ(2) = yp(1− pi(2)k2 )Lˆo
(2)
+ (yp − y(1)s )
k1∑
m=1
Smpi
(2)
m + yp
k2∑
m=k1+1
(pi(2)m − pi(2)k2 )Sm
+ y(2)s (1− γ)
N∑
j=1
j 6=2
k2∑
m=k1+1
Smpi
(j)
m > 0
(52)
Now, since all other end-users j ∈ {3, 4, · · · , N} are symmetric, it is sufficient to check the
saving of one of them and show that ∆µ(j) > 0 for all j ∈ {3, 4, · · · , N}
∆µ(j) = yp(1− pi(2)k2 )Lˆo
(j)
+ (yp − y(1)s )
k1∑
m=1
Smpi
(j)
m + (yp − y(2)s )
k2∑
m=k1+1
Smpi
(j)
m > 0 (53)
The carrier profit gain is:
∆R = yp
(
pi
(2)
k2
− 1
) N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+ yppi
(2)
k2
k2∑
m=1
Sm − yp
N∑
j=1
k2∑
m=1
Smpi
(j)
m + yp
 pi
(1)
k1
max
j∈{2,··· ,N}
m∈{1,··· ,k1}
pi
(j)
m

N∑
j=2
k1∑
m=1
Smpi
(j)
m
+ yp
 pi
(2)
k2
max
j∈{1,3,··· ,N}
m∈{k1+1,··· ,k1+k2}
pi
(j)
m

N∑
j=1
j 6=2
k2∑
m=k1+1
Smpi
(j)
m + β
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Smp
(j)
m − β
(
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+
k2∑
m=1
Sm
)
(54)
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Hence, a win-win situation is:
Rck2 =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣
β
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Smp
(j)
m > β
(
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+
k2∑
m=1
Sm
)
+ yˆ(1− pi(2)k2 )
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+ yˆ
k1∑
m=1
(pi(1)m − pi(2)k2 )Sm + yˆ
k2∑
m=k1+1
(pi(2)m − pi(2)k2 )Sm
+ yˆ
1− pi
(1)
k1
max
j∈{2,··· ,N}
m∈{1,··· ,k1}
pi
(j)
m

N∑
j=2
k1∑
m=1
Smpi
(j)
m + yˆ
1− pi
(2)
k2
max
j∈{1,3,··· ,N}
m∈{k1+1,··· ,k1+k2}
pi
(j)
m

N∑
j=1
j 6=2
k2∑
m=k1+1
Smpi
(j)
m
}
(55)
The win-win region defined in (55) can be expanded to the case when the carrier sets yo =
yˆpi
(N)
M , yp = yˆ and γ < 1. Each end-user j ∈ {1, · · · , N} reacts by downloading data contents
m ∈ {kj−1 + 1, kj−1 + 2, · · · , kj} and sells it to all other users. Hence, the win-win region will
be:
RcM =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣
β
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Smp
(j)
m > β
(
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+
k2∑
m=1
Sm
)
+ yˆ(1− pi(2)k2 )
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+ yˆ
N∑
j=1
kj∑
m=kj−1+1
(pi(j)m − pi(N)M )Sm + yˆ
N∑
j=1
1− pi
(j)
kj
max
i∈{1,··· ,N},i 6=j
m∈{kj−1+1,··· ,kj}
pi
(i)
m

N∑
i=1
i 6=j
k1∑
m=1
Smpi
(i)
m
}
(56)
Now, let us define Rcww to be the region were a win-win situation can happen and is defined
as:
Rcww =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣∆µ(j) > 0,∆R > 0} (57)
Hence, the union of all the win-win regions we have found for each carrier strategy has to be
a subset of the overall win-win region:
M⋃
m=1
Rcm ⊆ Rcww (58)
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Now, define Rcww to be the region were no win-win situation can happen and is defined as:
Rcww =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣∆µ(j) ≤ 0,∆R ≤ 0} (59)
Also,
Rcm =
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣yo = yppi(j)m ,∆µ(j) ≤ 0,∆R ≤ 0} (60)
Now, the intersection of all regions of no win-win for each carrier strategy has to be a subset
of the over all region of no win-win:
M⋂
m=1
Rcm ⊆ Rcww ⇔
( M⋃
m=1
Rcm
)
⊆
(
Rcww
)
⇔ Rcww ⊆
M⋃
m=1
Rcm
From (58) and (58) we conclude that:
Rcww =
M⋃
m=1
Rcm (61)
Moreover, (61) can be simplified more if we notice that Rc1 ⊇ Rc2 ⊇ Rc3 ⊇ · · · . ⊇ RcM , then⋃
mRcm = Rc1 and the win-win region is given by:
Rcwin−win = Rc1
=
{
p(j)m ,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
∣∣∣β N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
Smp
(j)
m >
β
(
S1 +
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
)
+ yˆ(1− pi(1)1 )
N∑
j=1
Lˆo
(j)
+ yˆS1
1− pi(1)1
max
j∈{2,··· ,N}
pi
(j)
1
 N∑
j=2
pi
(j)
1
}
(62)
